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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Gajadhar l
(decided December 18, 2007)
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Winston
Gajadhar's conviction of second degree murder and first degree at-
tempted robbery.2 The New York Court of Appeals granted Gajadhar
leave to appeal,3 but later affirmed the Appellate Divisions' order, re-
jecting his argument that his right to a jury trial, under the state con-
stitution, was violated.4 That right is afforded by Article I, section 2,
and Article VI section 18, which allegedly was violated when the trial
court erroneously allowed a deliberating jury of eleven persons to
convict the defendant, notwithstanding his consent to the jury size.5
The issue became whether a written waiver executed in accordance
with Article I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution allowed
the defendant to voluntarily waive the procedural right of a twelve-
' 9 N.Y.3d 438 (N.Y. 2007).
2 People v. Gajadhar, 828 N.Y.S.2d 346, 352, 354 (App. Div. 1st Dep't. 2007) ("[E]arlier
authority to the effect that a defendant cannot consent to trial before fewer than 12 jurors has
been implicitly overruled. In sum, defendant is bound by his waiver of the right to be tried
by a jury consisting of 12 persons.").
3 People v. Gajadhar, 868 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 2007).
4 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 448.
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cas-
es, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a written in-
strument signed by the defendant in person in open court before and with the approval of a
judge"); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18 ("[A] jury shall be composed of six or of twelve persons.
.. provided, however, that crimes prosecuted by indictment shall be tried by a jury composed
of twelve persons, unless a jury trial has been waived as provided in section two of article
one"); Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 441.
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member jury and permit a deliberating jury of eleven individuals to
decide the defendant's fate.6
Gajadhar and Tony Norg operated an automobile repair busi-
ness as partners. In 1994, Sammi Fiki owed the business $1,500 for
repairs made to his car.7 Fiki stopped payment on a check he had
written because allegedly the car required further repairs that would
cost more than the unpaid bill, implying he wanted to pay only once.
Upon the business's dissolution, Gajadhar was distributed the receiv-
able owed by Fiki and it became his obligation to collect the debt.8
Gajadhar went to Fiki's office to request the amount owed to him but
Fiki was not familiar with the defendant and would only speak with
his business partner, Norg. Gajadhar left the office, and left the re-
turned check with Fiki. 9
A few days later, the defendant returned to Fiki's office ac-
companied by an unknown person and demanded the money owed to
Gajadhar. There were three individuals present when Fiki and this
unknown accomplice entered the office: Fiki, his brother Mosad El-
fiki and a friend, Hisham Omar. Fiki denied knowing he owed the
defendant any money, and finally the unknown man asked the defen-
dant" 'Is this the guy?' and the defendant replied, 'Yes, take care of
them.' ",o Immediately after, the unknown man locked the door,
pulled out a gun, and after a resulting struggle, Fiki, his brother and
his friend were all shot. During the altercation, the two accomplices
6 Gajadhar, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
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fled when they realized Fiki was on the phone with the police. The
victims were brought to the hospital, where Fiki's brother was pro-
nounced dead, though Fiki and Omar survived.l"
Police suspected Gajadhar fled back to his native country,
Trinidad. 12 Detectives' efforts in locating the defendant were hin-
dered by a treaty between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago.
The treaty "required a suspect to be under indictment in order to be
subject to extradition."'' 3 It was not until February of 1994 that detec-
tives were able to obtain an indictment in order to comply with the
treaty terms. The defendant returned to the United States sometime
later, and in 1999 authorities were able to locate him again, at another
auto repair shop. Once again, Gajadhar fled to Trinidad, but this time
he was detained by local authorities because of his altered passport.
He was held until the United States extradited him from Trinidad to
New York to face the charges filed against him.'
4
Three days after jury deliberation commenced, juror number
nine was hospitalized. The court was notified the juror would not be
able to participate further in the deliberation due to the hospitalization
and the defense counsel requested that deliberation continue, not-
withstanding the juror's absence. Defense counsel argued, "Given
the length of the trial, the number of witnesses involved, and frankly,
the availability of eleven jurors who have been working very hard
now into the fourth day ... we should forge ahead with eleven ju-
" Gajadhar, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
12 Id.




Maehr: Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Gajadhar
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
rors." 15 The prosecution agreed with the defendant's basis for the
motion to proceed but was concerned that Cancemi v. People'6 prohi-
bited such a waiver, as the law was unclear. 7 Gajadhar's attorney
persisted his client had the "right to have this jury make a decision."' 8
The defendant and his counsel executed the following waiver in open
court:
The defendant herein, having been indicted for two
counts of murder in the second degree, two counts of
attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of
assault in the first degree and one count of attempted
robbery in the first degree, and having been informed
of his right to be tried under said indictment by a jury
of twelve persons, hereby in Open Court waives his
right to trial by jury, pursuant to Article I, section 2, of
the Constitution of the State of New York, and Article
270 of the Criminal Procedure Law, to the extent that,
in view of the unavailability of juror number 9, he re-
quests that he be tried by a jury consisting of the re-
maining eleven sworn jurors and that deliberations
continue to verdict with those jurors. The defendant
opposes the declaration of a mistrial. Furthermore, to
the extent that such review may be waived, should
there be a judgment of conviction, the defendant
waives any appellate review of the lawfulness of this
waiver. 19
The court found the waiver effective and allowed the jury to
15 Id.
16 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) ("[A] criminal defendant [is prohibited] from consenting to a jury
of less than 12.").
17 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 441.
18 People v. Gajadhar, 753 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (internal quotations
omitted). Gajadhar's counsel cited People v. Page, 665 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1996), and
People v. Ryan, 224 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1966) as the source of this right. Id.
'9 Gajadhar, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 311-12.
354 [Vol. 24
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continue to deliberate with only eleven members. 20  Thereafter, that
eleven-person jury convicted the defendant of felony murder for a
term of twenty years to life and first degree attempted robbery for a
term of five to fifteen years; the terms were to run concurrently.2'
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of
jury size-Williams v. Florida22 helped guide the New York Court of
Appeals in deciding the issue. In Williams, the Florida Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the constitutionality of a six-person jury that ultimate-
ly convicted the defendant of robbery and sentenced him to life.23
The defendant was granted certiorari and the United States Supreme
Court was asked "whether the constitutional guarantee of a trial by
'jury' necessarily requires trial by exactly 12 persons, rather than
some lesser number-in this case six."'24  The Court reasoned the
"Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury in all
criminal cases that-were they to be tried in a federal court-would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee., 25 Thus, the criminal
20 Id. at 312. The court found the waiver effective because the record and the waiver itself
evinced that the defendant "fully understood his right to a jury trial, including the right to a
jury of twelve persons, and that he was making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision
to waive that right to the extent of agreeing to have the remaining eleven members of the
jury deliberate to verdict." Id.
21 Gajadhar, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (acquitting the defendant of all other charges).
22 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
23 Williams, 399 U.S. at 79-80.
24 Id. at 86.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileg-
es or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
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defendant had the right not to have his Sixth Amendment protection
violated by the state court's decree.
The Court then analyzed the historical context of the meaning
of twelve and its relevance to both the composition and instrumentali-
ty of the jury, finding that the number twelve affixed to the common
law jury was a historical accident, 6 rather than related to the "great
purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place. 27 Thus, the
question that remained to be answered was whether the "accidental
feature of the jury ha[d] been immutably codified into our Constitu-
tion. 28 In a previous decision, the United States Supreme Court had
assumed the number was fixed at twelve in interpreting the Sixth
Amendment.29 In Thompson v. Utah,3 ° the Court reversed a convic-
tion by the state's eight-person jury, and in doing so, merely stated
that the word "jury" in the text of the Sixth Amendment referred to a
jury " 'constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, nei-
ther more nor less.' ,,3 But the Court's support for this notion was
merely based on references to the Magna Carta and other treatises
and lacked any evidence that "every feature of the jury as it existed at
common law-whether incidental or essential to that institution-
was necessarily included in the Constitution wherever that document
Williams, 399 U.S. at 86 (relying on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
26 Williams, 399 U.S. at 87-88 (referring to the number that comprised a presentment jury
or other reasons, such as "Lord Coke's explanation that the 'number of twelve is much res-
pected in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes,' is typical").
27 Id. at 89-90. The greatest purpose being "[tihat history revealed a long tradition attach-
ing great importance to the concept of relying on a body of one's peers to determine guilt or
innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement." Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 90.
29 Id.
30 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
31 Williams, 399 U.S. at 90 (quoting Thompson, 170 U.S. at 349).
356 [Vol. 24
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referred to a 'jury.' "32 The Court could not support this proposition
with constitutional history and the drafter's intent of Article III's
"jury" was not dispositive.33
Thus, the Court looked to the function of the jury and whether
the twelve-person feature was essential. 34 The feature was found dis-
pensable so long as the jury remained "large enough to promote
group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to
provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section
of the community."35 Although the Court did not draw a bright line
rule as to minimum jury size, it held a six-person jury would meet
these requirements and is above the minimum.36 Thus, so long as the
requisite number of jurors is present to constitute a "jury," the Sixth
Amendment right would not be violated.37 The Court further found
that, where unanimity is still required, the size of the jury does not
impede on its function as either a procedural safeguard against gov-
ernment oppression or its function as a fact-finder.38 Thus, the Sixth
Amendment is not violated when the criminal defendant is convicted
by a six-person jury, where he would have otherwise been convicted
by a twelve-person jury.
39
32 Id. at 90-91.
" Id. at 92-93.
34 Id. at 99-100.
" Id. at 100.
36 Williams, 399 U.S. at 92 n.28 (stating six is above the minimum number of individuals
who can constitute a jury, although not determining a minimum).
37 Id. at 100 (holding a jury's function "is to prevent oppression by the Government.
'Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestima-
ble safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, bi-
ased, or eccentric judge' "(quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156)).
3 Id. at 100-01.
39 Id. at 103.
2008]
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To understand the New York Court of Appeals' rationale for
deeming Gajadhar's waiver effective, it is important to analyze the
progeny of cases and the constitutional amendments that led to the
Court of Appeals' ultimate decision. The court first entertained its
own 150-year-old decision in Cancemi, to determine whether Gajad-
har's waiver was constitutionally permissible.40 In Cancemi, the de-
fendant was convicted of murder by an eleven-person jury when the
defendant requested one juror be removed.41 The defendant executed
a waiver in open court, consenting and requesting he be tried by the
eleven-person jury rather than by the twelve-person jury. The trial
court granted his request, and the defendant was convicted of murder
by the eleven-person jury. On appeal, the Cancemi court reasoned
the eleven-person verdict was unrecognizable at law and deemed the
verdict a nullity. The court reasoned such modifications would lead
down a slippery slope.43 But the United States Supreme Court, in
Williams v. Florida, rebutted this slippery slope notion. "[O]ne re-
cognizes that he can get off the 'slippery slope' before he reaches the
bottom."44 In holding the waiver unconstitutional the New York
Court of Appeals merely stated, "It would be a highly dangerous in-
novation, in reference to criminal cases ... for the court to allow of
any number short of a full panel of twelve jurors, and we think it
ought not to be tolerated. 45 But as Williams demonstrates, there is
40 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 443.
41 Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 129.
42 Id. at 128.
41 Id. at 138.
44 Williams, 399 U.S. at 92 n.28.
45 Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138.
[Vol. 24
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no support for this announcement-as long as unanimity is retained,
the size of the jury will have no affect on its ability to effectuate fact-
finding or to prevent government oppression.46
The New York Court of Appeals distinguished Gajadhar
from Cancemi. When Cancemi was decided, the constitution did not
permit any type of jury waiver in any criminal, proceeding.47 It was
not until the 1938 amendment to the New York State Constitution
that such waiver were allowed. 48 The constitutional amendment to
Article I, section 2 specified the proper procedure for procuring and
executing a waiver of the type sought and granted to Gajadhar.49 Af-
ter the 1938 amendment, Article I, section 2 read, in pertinent part:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall re-
main inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived
by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be pre-
scribed by law. The legislature may provide, howev-
er, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less
than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case. A jury
trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be
punishable by death, by a written instrument signed by
the defendant in person in open court before and with
the approval of a judge or justice of a court having ju-
risdiction to try the offense.°
Subsequently in 1962, the New York State Constitution was
further amended to provide Article VI, section 18.
46 Williams, 399 U.S. at 100-01.
47 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 447.
48 Id. at 446.
41 Id. at 444.
50 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
2008] 359
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The legislature may provide that in any court of origi-
nal jurisdiction a jury shall be composed of six or of
twelve persons and may authorize any court which
shall have jurisdiction over crimes and other violations
of law, other than crimes prosecuted by indictment, to
try such matters without a jury, provided, however,
that crimes prosecuted by indictment shall be tried by
a jury composed of twelve persons, unless a jury trial
has been waived as provided in section two of article
one of this constitution.5'
Consequently, in deciding Gajadhar, the landscape changed
from that of Cancemi, even assuming that Cancemi had the proper
support for announcing that the Constitution's jury was identical to
the common law jury of twelve. Thus, the court faced issues of in-
terpretation of the two above mentioned provisions and their interre-
lation.
The first case to deal with these constitutional amendments
that helped guide the New York Court of Appeals in its decision was
People v. Ryan.52 In Ryan, the defendants were convicted of first de-
gree robbery and second degree assault and appealed based on an al-
leged violation of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. 3 The
defendants argued their right to a jury trial was violated when an al-
ternate juror took the place of an originally-impaneled juror who be-
came ill, five hours into deliberation, thus making it a thirteen-
member jury. Although defense counsel consented to the substitution
of the alternate juror in open court, the defendants had not given their
51 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (emphasis added).
52 224 N.E.2d 710 (1966).
" Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 711.
360 [Vol. 24
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 2, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/12
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
consent, nor were they consulted.5 4 The Ryan court found that, al-
though the substitution was in accordance with New York State law,
the alternate juror was kept from the deliberation for five hours, and
he ceased to be a juror once ousted from the initial deliberation.55
Since the original juror was then subsequently replaced by another
juror, the court deemed it to be a thirteen-person jury, and thus re-
versed the conviction and ordered a new trial.56 Although the prose-
cution argued defense counsel had executed a valid waiver, the court
found that it did not meet the constitutional requirements because on-
ly the defense counsel waived the "inclusory right" to a twelve-
person jury trial, not the defendants.57 Thus, the implication is that if
the defendants had signed and executed the waiver in open court,
then the waiver would have been valid, consequently making a thir-
teen-man jury constitutional. 58 The application of this case to Gajad-
har is that if a valid waiver of a thirteen-person jury is constitutional-
ly permissible, then according to that same principle, a valid waiver
of an eleven-person jury should be constitutionally permissible so
long as the procedural safeguards are met: a written instrument,
signed in open court by both the defendant and his attorney.59
In the wake of Ryan, the New York Legislature enacted sec-
54 Id.
55 Id. at 712 (" '[1]f deliberations had progressed to a stage where the original eleven were
in substantial agreement, they were in a position to present a formidable obstacle to the al-
ternate juror's attempts to persuade and convince the eleven remaining original jurors.'
56 Id. at 713.
57 id.
58 Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 713.
59 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 447.
2008]
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tion 270.35 of the Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL 270.35",).6o CPL
270.35 specifically provides for the procedural waiver requirements
to be satisfied before the substitution of an originally-impaneled juror
for an alternate juror.6' The language of CPL 270.35 is identical to
Article I, section 2 of the state constitution. Thus "an alternate juror
can be substituted for a juror after deliberations have commenced if
the defendant personally consents to the substitution in writing and in
open court., 6 2  Consequently, when a defendant strictly complies
with the statutory language in CPL 270.35, the court would deem
such a waiver valid under Article 1, section 2 of the New York State
Constitution.63
The New York Court of Appeals demonstrated its adherence
to this requirement of strict compliance with the CPL 270.35 when
deciding People v. Page.64 On November 19, 1990, the defendant
obtained the victim's car keys and drove away with the co-
defendant. 65 About ten minutes later, they were apprehended by the
authorities in the car. The defendant was charged with grand larceny
in the third degree and "unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 66 After
trial, the defense counsel requested the court not to release the alter-
nate juror and the alternate was instructed not to discuss the case.
60 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35 (McKinney 2002) ("[I]f the trial jury has begun its de-
liberations, the defendant must consent to such replacement. Such consent must be in writing
and must be signed by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court."
(emphasis added)).
61 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 445.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 665 N.E.2d 1041 (1996).
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Four hours after deliberation had begun, a juror became ill and
needed to be excused. Defense counsel, after consulting with defen-
dant, requested the alternate juror who had not been released be used
as a substitute for the ill juror.67 The court then asked the defendant
whether he consented to the substitution and whether he had con-
sulted with his counsel in making such a strategic decision, because
the implications of such consent would be a waiver of his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. The defendant said he had consented and
had consulted with his attorney. The court proceeded to substitute
the jurors without the defendant's written consent. Subsequently, the
"new" jury convicted the defendant of grand larceny in the third de-
gree and "unauthorized use of a motor vehicle."68
On appeal, the defendant argued that without his written con-
sent to the waiver, the constitutional requirements were not met and
his waiver was invalid.69 Thus, the issue was whether a waiver could
be created orally and be deemed valid when a defendant orally con-
sents to a juror substitution after deliberation began. 70 The oral con-
sent was found insufficient; strict compliance with the statute was re-
quired to ensure the state's constitutional requirements are met before
a substitution of a juror is to occur after deliberation commenced.
The prosecution's argument that the need for a written waiver was a
mere technicality was rejected.7 ' The court stated, "The history of
the constitutional waiver provision thus establishes that the require-
67 Id. at 1042 (majority opinion).
68 Id. at 1043.
69 Id. at 1042-43.
70 Page, 665 N.E.2d at 1042.
"' Id. at 1043.
2008] 363
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ment that the defendant execute a signed, written waiver was consi-
dered critical to securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver
of the right to trial by jury. 72 Thus, the writing requirement is a crit-
ical procedural safeguard to ensure that the defendant is making a vo-
litional, intelligible, decision. As the court explained," 'it is a human
habit to think twice before one signs a paper.' ,73 Thus, the court
held "that a waiver of the right to jury trial procured other than by a
written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court is
invalid. 74
The implication of Page, in regards to Gajadhar, is that, but
for Page's oral consent, where a written consent was otherwise ob-
tained, his waiver would have been valid and a jury comprising of a
number other than twelve would be constitutional.75 Thus according
to that same principle, a jury consisting of a number other than
twelve, as in Gajadhar, would be deemed constitutional, assuming
strict compliance with the statutory waiver requirements.76
The court furthered its argument in Gajadhar with the notion
that the waiver provides a defendant with more options, affording a
defendant more control over the right to a jury trial, even though the
constitutional amendments and the precedent cases clearly deem the
defendant's waiver valid. If the circumstances are such that an "in-
clusory twelve person jury" is not possible for some reason, then the
72 Id. at 1044.
73 Id. (quoting 2 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, APRIL 5, TO AUGUST 26, 1938 1282).
74 Id. at 1046 (internal quotations omitted).
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defendant now has more options in determining his or her fate.77 For
instance, if the defendant decides, after consulting with counsel, he
would have a more favorable outcome retrying the case, then he need
not execute the waiver and a mistrial will result.78 But if a defendant
decides, after consulting with counsel, that forging ahead with this
jury would produce a more favorable outcome, then the defendant
need only execute the waiver to the jury trial in strict compliance
with the statutory text.
7 9
Additionally, the execution of a valid waiver successfully es-
tablished the right to a jury trial as a personal right to the defendant
that he may waive, just as he may waive any other personal rights
such as, "the right to counsel," "the right to testify," and "the right to
present a defense., 80 Accordingly, where the defendant consented in
a signed, written instrument, in open court, with the presiding judge's
approval, such a waiver is enforceable once executed. The court has
the responsibility to make sure that "express provisions of our Consti-
tution... be vigilantly enforced and the rights they protect zealously
guarded.",81 Where a defendant strictly complies with the statutory
language to effectuate such a waiver, it is evident the defendant made
the decision " 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently,' " and the
court should thus vigilantly enforce such waivers as there is no more
a court can do to safeguard such rights. 82 No matter how unwise Ga-
77 Id.
78 Id. at 448.
79 Id.
80 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 448.
81 Page, 665 N.E.2d at 1046.
82 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 448.
2008]
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jadhar's decision was to waive his right to an "inclusory twelve-man
jury trial," he made that decision and it is the responsibility of the
courts to enforce it.83 Consequently, to allow a defendant to validly
waive his right to an "inclusory right to a jury of twelve" and then al-
lege that such consent was insufficient would "flout the purposes of
the waiver rule.,
84
Lastly, it appears that there should be less constitutional con-
cern in Gajadhar than cases like Ryan and Page. In Ryan and Page,
the concern associated with the thirteenth juror, when not validly
waived, seems more prevalent than the eleven-personn jury should
be. The thirteenth juror may prejudice the defendant where the origi-
nal members of a jury already have a basis for their decision, and the
thirteenth juror has little or no ability to persuade the other jurors
when deliberation has already commenced. 5 But where a jury is
comprised of less than twelve and the procedure for executing the
waiver was strictly complied with, the defense has little room for ar-
guing prejudice. The only argument the defense can then muster is
that the defendant was prejudiced because the excused juror, who
was intelligibly waived, could have been the juror that created a hung
jury, when the other eleven wanted to convict.86 That argument is
easily rebutted by the fact the excused juror could have been the rea-
son for a hung jury when the other eleven jurors wanted to acquit.
83 Id.
84 Page, 665 N.E.2d at 1043 (internal quotations omitted).
85 Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 712 ("[D]efendants argue, the alternate juror entered the jury room
after the eleven original jurors had sifted the evidence and, in all probability, already formu-
lated their preliminary positions [and] each of the eleven jurors was aware of the outlooks
and positions of the others .... (internal quotations omitted)).
86 Williams, 399 U.S. at 101.
[Vol. 24
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Thus, the prejudice of a smaller jury is negligible, especially where
the procedural safeguards in waiving such a right have been satisfied,
putting the constitutional concerns at rest. It would appear now that
both the New York State Constitution and the United States Constitu-
tion allow for a jury of less than twelve persons, when the criminal
defendants "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" waive their
right, with a signed, written instrument, in open court, with the pre-
siding judge's approval.87
Joseph Maehr
87 Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d at 448.
2008]
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CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
United States Constitution Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him or her.
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